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submitted that a uniform cooperative law, encompassing the appli-
cable landlord-tenant statutes, would serve to identify remedies
which properly may be employed by cooperative tenants.136
Kerry B. Conners
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
District Attorney's office automatically disqualified when attor-
ney in office had counseled defendant previously in same case
An attorney is confronted with a conflict of interest when after
counseling a criminal defendant he joins the staff of the prosecut-
ing District Attorney. 3 7 To neutralize this conflict and avoid dis-
Cooperatives, Lofts, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 3. It is suggested that the result in
Suarez has helped balance the respective rights and remedies of the cooperative lessor and
lessee by affording the lessee a defense to such proceedings. See Laight Coop. Corp. v.
Kenny, 105 Misc. 2d 1001, 1003-04, 430 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1980); Lehner & Sweet, supra, at 6, col. 2.
In Bourgeois v. Tangerine Realty Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 468, 312 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1970), however, the court held that cooperative shareholders could not
bring a special proceeding under section 778 of article 7-A of the Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law. 63 Misc. 2d at 469, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 233. This proceedings allows tenants
to move rent deposits from the possession of the landlord to a third party to be used for
building repairs. See RPAPL § 778 (1979). In section 778, however, the statutory language
was not alternatively worded as in section 235-b, rather it merely said "tenants," id., which
the court distinguished from tenant-shareholders. 63 Misc. 2d at 469, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 233. A
statute which gives tenants the right to recover attorney's fees might not be appropriate in
the cooperative setting. See N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 234 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In-
deed, the scheme of monetary distribution provided for by such a statute might better be
decided by shareholders with equity interests. Moreover, it is suggested that section 235-b
was not intended to apply to the condominium form of housing. In a cooperative, the resi-
dent occupies his apartment under a proprietary lease, but the individual condominium
apartments are owned by the dwellers themselves. See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note
114, § 1.02[3]. The absence of a lease in the condominium form of housing would seem to
take such housing out of the scope of section 235-b.
138 See Rohan, Cooperative Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and En-
forcement Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1337 (1966).
"37 See People v. DeFreese, 71 App. Div. 2d 689, 690, 418 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (2d Dep't
1979). The Code of Professional Responsibility requires an attorney to "preserve the confi-
dences and secrets of a client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (THE CODE),
Canon 4 (1979). Thus, an attorney has a duty to a client to avoid employment which might
compromise those confidences. Cardinale v. Golinello, 43 N.Y.2d 288, 294-95, 372 N.E.2d 26,
30, 401 N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (1977). The proper functioning of the legal system requires this
strict loyalty to the client, THE CODE, EC 4-1, and mandates that it continue after the attor-
ney-client relationship terminates. THE CODE, EC 4-6. In addition, the Code prohibits even
the appearance of improper conduct on the part of an attorney. THE CODE, Canon 9. It has
been stated with respect to an attorney's responsibility that "confidence is reposed in him;
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qualification, prosecutors' offices typically "screen" attorneys from
cases involving defendants they previously represented.3 8 Until re-
life, liberty, character and property should be protected by him. He should guard, with jeal-
ous watchfulness, his own reputation, as well as that of his profession." People ex rel. Cutler
v. Ford, 54 1ll. 520, 522 (1870); see THE CODE, EC 9-6. One commentator has noted that
"[t]o maintain public confidence in the Bar it is necessary not only to avoid actual wrong
doing but an appearance of wrong doing." H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 115 (1953). See Ro-
tante v. Lawrence Hosp., 46 App. Div. 2d 199, 200, 361 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1st Dep't 1974);
Edelman v. Levy, 42 App. Div. 2d 758, 758, 346 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (2d Dep't 1973). Cases in
which an attorney has been hired in the office which is prosecuting his former client have
turned, nevertheless, on whether actual prejudice to the defendant has been shown. See
note 139 and accompanying text infra.
13 See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 55 App. Div. 2d 921, 921, 390 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't
1977). Private law firms face problems of disqualification when attorneys who have worked
for the opposite side join the firm. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc); Laskey Bros. of W. Va., Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932
(1956). In larger firms, attempts have been made to "screen off" new attorneys from cases in
which they had a preexisting interest. See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-
Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 678 (1980). The typical "screen" or "Chinese
Wall" involves procedures designed to prevent the attorney "infected" with knowledge of
confidential information about an adverse party from revealing it to other members of the
firm by creating an "impermeable barrier" between the infected attorney and those attor-
neys involved in the case. Id. at 678. For the most part, courts have been reluctant to sanc-
tion screening procedures. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980);
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977); Comment,
supra, at 67. But see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). In Cheng, an attorney, while em-
ployed with legal services, represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action
against the defendant. 631 F.2d at 1054. The attorney subsequently was hired by the law
firm representing the defendant. Id. The firm claimed that the attorney worked in a differ-
ent department and had no involvement in the case. Id. The Second Circuit, noting the
relatively small size of the firm, refused to accept this "Chinese Wall" defense. Id. at 1058.
Because of day-to-day contacts, the danger of an unintentional transmitting of information
was simply too great. The court stated:
If after considering all of the precautions taken by the [disqualified] firm this
Court still harbors doubts as to the sufficiency of these preventive measures, then
we can hardly expect Cheng or members of the public to consider the attempted
quarantine to be impenetrable.
Id. While the Cheng court primarily relied on DR 5-105(D), which provides that the dis-
qualification of an attorney generally will disqualify all who are affiliated with him, the court
also noted that fears of a tainted trial and appearances of impropriety, see THE CODE,
Canon 9, required firm disqualification. 631 F.2d at 1059.
Notably, when the court is satisfied that the underlying trial will not be tainted, dis-
qualification will not be ordered. 631 F.2d at 1058-59; Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at
445 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
See also Comment, Firm Disqualification Motions-Screening and Immediate Appeals as
of Right: Armstrong v. McAlpin, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 346, 359-60 (1981). While the vacat-
ing of the Armstrong decision annuls its precedential value, the standard, requiring that the
underlying trial be tainted before disqualification is necessary, remains valid. Id. at 359
n.82. See generally Comment, Disqualification-"Screening to Rebut the Automatic Law
19811
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cently, courts have refused to disqualify an entire district attor-
ney's office absent a showing of actual prejudice resulting from
continued prosecution."3 9 In People v. Shinkle,140 however, the
Court of Appeals held that prior participation in a defendant's
case by an attorney in the prosecutor's office disqualifies all office
attorneys from prosecuting the case.' 4 1
In Shinkle, the defendant was indicted on felony charges. 142
Edward Leopold, as Executive Director of the Legal Aid Society of
Sullivan County, advised the defendant and became familiar with
his case. 43 Subsequently, Leopold left Legal Aid and accepted a
position with the Sullivan County District Attorney.' 44 To dispel
any potential conflict of interest, Leopold had "conflict" stickers
affixed to all pending cases, including Shinkle, in which the defen-
Firm Disqualification Rule." Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977), 82
DICK. L. REV. 625 (1977); Comment, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Gov-
ernment Attorney: Firm or Individual Disqualification?, 1977 DuKE L.J. 512; Comment,
The Chinese Wall Defense to Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1980).
139 See, e.g., People v. DeFreese, 71 App. Div. 2d 689, 690, 418 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (2d
Dep't 1979); People v. Cruz, 55 App. Div. 2d 921, 921, 390 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't
1977). When a defendant claimed actual prejudice resulting from the transfer of his legal
services attorney to the prosecutor's office, he was granted a new trial "if, and only if, he
ha[d] been demonstrably prejudiced by the District Attorney's prior affiliation." 55 App.
Div. 2d at 921-22, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (citations omitted). Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76-77 (1942) (defendant must show that denial of codefendant's constitutional
rights resulted in actual prejudice to him). See also People v. Loewinger, 37 App. Div. 2d
675, 676, 323 N.Y.S.2d 98, 100-01 (3d Dep't 1971) (per curiam), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 587, 281
N.E.2d 847, 330 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972); Fox v. Shapiro, 84 Misc. 2d 223, 224, 375 N.Y.S.2d
945, 948 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1975).
-140 51 N.Y.2d 417, 415 N.E.2d 909, 434 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1980).
"4 Id. at 424, 415 N.E.2d at 912, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 922. Criminal courts are authorized to
appoint special prosecutors pursuant to section 701 of the County Law which provides that
"[wihenever the district attorney of any county ... is disqualified from acting in a particu-
lar case ... a superior criminal court ... may ... appoint some attorney at law having an
office in or residing in the county, to act as special district attorney during the. . . disquali-
fication of the district attorney . . . ." N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 701 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1980). Section 701 is intended to provide relief to a district attorney who cannot perform his
duties due to illness, disqualification or other reasons. Board of Supervisors v. Aulisi, 62
App. Div. 2d 644, 406 N.Y.S.2d 570 (3d Dep't), af'd, 46 N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1302, 413
N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978). When circumstances warrant, the Governor may appoint a special
prosecutor at county expense. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980); see
Berger v. Carey, 86 Misc. 2d 727, 728, 383 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
142 51 N.Y.2d at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 919. The defendant was
charged with rape in the first degree, petit larceny, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and
assault in the third degree. Id.
143 Id. at 419, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 919. The Court noted that Leopold
had interviewed Shinkle extensively, had become "intimately familiar" with his file and had
helped plan his defense strategy. Id.
14 Id. at 419-20, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
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dants had been represented by Legal Aid during Leopold's term as
Executive Director.145 In addition, Leopold was neither permitted
access to those files nor allowed to discuss the cases with other
members of the District Attorney's office. 148 Nevertheless, the de-
fendant in Shinkle contended that a conflict of interest remained
and repeatedly attempted to bar the office from prosecuting his
case. 147 Notwithstanding the defendant's efforts, an attorney from
the District Attorney's office prosecuted the case and secured the
defendant's conviction.'48 The defendant appealed, claiming that
Leopold's presence in the prosecutor's office was prejudicial to his
defense. 49 The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed
the conviction, maintaining that Leopold had successfully isolated
himself from the case and that the defendant had failed to show
actual prejudice to his defense. 50
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the appellate division.' 5' Writing for the majority,'52 Judge Jones
noted that the screening procedures followed by the District Attor-
ney's office could not diminish the "inherent impropriety" which
existed.5 3 The Court rejected the view that the defendant must
show actual prejudice, stating that since proof of impropriety
15 Id. at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
141 Id. The Sullivan County District Attorney's office consists of the District Attorney
and four assistants. Telephone conversation with Joseph Jaffe, District Attorney for Sulli-
van County (March 9, 1981).
1.47 51 N.Y.2d at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 919. Shinkle instituted an
article 78 proceeding to bar the District Attorney's office from prosecuting his case, but his
application was denied both initially and upon reargument. Id. A similar application
presented to the trial court was also denied. Id. at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
919-20.
148 73 App. Div. 2d 764, 764, 423 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (3d Dep't 1979).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 765, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 550. The majority in the appellate division emphasized
that there was no evidence that Leopold revealed any confidences he may have gained
through his association with the defendant. Id. Thus, there was no reason why the District
Attorney's office could not prosecute the case. Id. The dissent focused on Leopold's exten-
sive contact with the defendant and questioned the majority view that the defendant must
bear the burden of proof that there was prejudice. Id., 423 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Kane, J., dis-
senting). The dissent maintained that, because of the difficulty the defendant would have in
proving actual prejudice, a special prosecutor ought to be appointed even if the screening
procedure was shown to be effective. Id. (Kane, J., dissenting) (citing People v. DeFreese, 71
App. Div. 2d 689, 690, 418 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (Hopkins, J., dissenting)).
I1 51 N.Y.2d at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 911, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
182 Judge Jones wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judges Gabrielli, Wachtler,
Fuchsberg and Meyer. Judge Jasen wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke
concurred.
158 51 N.Y.2d at 421, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
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would not be within the defendant's reach, it would be unjust to
place such a burden on the defendant.' Judge Jones noted that
the defendant would perceive that his former attorney was now
prosecuting the case against him, thus denying him the right to an
appearance of total loyalty on the part of attorney who would be
defending him. 55 The Court concluded, therefore, that the failure
to disqualify the District Attorney's office from the prosecution
was a sufficient basis for the reversal of the conviction. 5 '
Authoring a vigorous dissent, Judge Jasen characterized the
majority's adoption of an automatic disqualification rule as an un-
necessary and undesirable restriction on the prosecutor's office.'
15 7
The dissent observed that the screening procedures employed in
Shinkle adequately safeguarded the defendant's rights, and main-
tained that the defendant should be required to show at least some
prejudice to his case before disqualification would be warranted. 15
Judge Jasen contended that automatic disqualification implies
that, despite the existence of a code of ethics, government attor-
neys cannot be trusted either to discharge their duties faithfully or
to maintain the confidences of former clients. 59 He further rea-
soned that appearances of impropriety would persist even were a
special prosecutor to be appointed, since the prosecutor would
have access to the files and personnel of the District Attorney's
office. 60 Judge Jasen concluded that, when no evidence is pro-
'5 Id. Implicit in the Court's rationale is the concern for the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. When a conflict of interest exists, an attorney's
failure to disqualify himself denies the defendant the right to effective counsel. See Grant v.
United States, 447 F. Supp. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir. 1978).
" 51 N.Y.2d at 421, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 920. Judge Jones noted that
the defendant would perceive that his own attorney was "personally championing the Peo-
ple's cause against him." Id.
1-6 Id. at 421, 415 N.E.2d at 911, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
157 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
"I Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). The success of an appeal in which an apparent conflict
has been alleged by the defendant has turned on the defendant's ability to show that his
case has been prejudiced by the conflict. See note 139 and accompanying text supra. See
also People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 89, 281 N.E.2d 167, 169, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (1972);
People v. Little, 44 App. Div. 2d 873, 874, 355 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (3d Dep't 1974); People v.
Moore, 30 App. Div. 2d 720, 721, 291 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (3d Dep't 1968). The dissent also
argued that an abuse of confidence, if one exists, could be ascertained from the proof offered
by the prosecutor. 51 N.Y.2d at 423-24, 415 N.E.2d at 912, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
19 51 N.Y.2d at 424, 415 N.E.2d at 912, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). It appears likely that a special prosecutor will require
access to prosecutor's files. In addition, he may need to discuss the pre-trial stages if dis-
qualification does not take place immediately. Thus, the danger that confidential informa-
[Vol. 55:773
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duced showing disclosure of confidential information, the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor is not necessary to protect the integ-
rity of the prosecution.161
The Shinkle Court's adoption of an automatic disqualification
rule is an appropriate method of ensuring that the integrity of the
prosecutor's office is protected.16 2 It is suggested that when a crimi-
nal defendant has shared confidences with an attorney he has a
right to be free from the appearance of impropriety which natu-
rally would arise should that attorney join the District Attorney's
office prosecuting his case.16 3 Moreover, the defendant should not
have the burden of proving prejudice since the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, by requiring the attorney to avoid any ap-
pearance of impropriety, operates to prevent such dilemmas.164
It is submitted, however, that Shinkle should not be read as
requiring blanket disqualification of all prosecutors' offices under
all circumstances.'" Rather, courts should consider the size of the
tion will be divulged, in Judge Jasen's view, would continue to exist. Id. at 424, 415 N.E.2d
at 912, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
101 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
162 The Court of Appeals, by adopting a per se disqualification rule, apparently has
rejected the requirement of actual prejudice dictated by the lower courts. E.g., People v.
DeFreese, 71 App. Div. 2d 689, 690, 418 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (2d Dep't 1979); People v. Cruz,
55 App. Div. 2d 921, 921, 390 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't 1977). See note 139 and accompa-
nying text supra. In People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 395, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707, 434
N.Y.S.2d 206, 209 (1980), the Court of Appeals noted that "no matter how firmly and con-
scientiously a District Attorney may steel himself against the intrusion of a competing and
disqualifying interest, he never can be certain that he has succeeded in isolating himself
from the inroads on his subconscious." Id. While Zimmer involved a more direct conflict of
interest than that in Shinkle, the decision nevertheless was indicative of the Court's deter-
mination to apply a strict standard whereby any reasonable possibility of impropriety will
result in disqualification. See Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1357,
418 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (1979); Cardinale v. Golinello, 43 N.Y.2d 288, 296, 372 N.E.2d 26, 30,
401 N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (1977). But see People v. Wilkins, 28 N.Y.2d 53, 55, 268 N.E.2d 756,
757, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (1971); People v. Little, 44 App. Div. 2d 873, 874, 355 N.Y.S.2d 654,
655 (3d Dep't 1974); People v. Clement, 278 App. Div. 1040, 1040, 106 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813 (3d
Dep't 1951).
163 See People v. DeFreese, 71 App. Div. 2d 689, 691, 418 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (2d Dep't
1979) (Hopkins, J., dissenting). Judge Hopkins argued that "[i]rrespective of any actual det-
riment, the first client is entitled to freedom from apprehension and to certainty that his
interest will not be prejudiced . .. ." Id.
16 See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
'16 It seems clear that the Shinkle majority primarily was concerned with Leopold's
active representation of the defendant. 51 N.Y.2d at 420, 415 N.E.2d at 910, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
919; note 143 supra. It is suggested, however, that the Court adopt a two-step approach.
First, it should determine whether an attorney on the District Attorney's staff personally
represented a particular defendant. Any personal representation should result in disqualifi-
cation of the entire prosecutor's office. Second, absent personal representation, the individ-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:773
prosecutor's office and the extent of the transferring attorney's
contacts with the defendant before ruling on disqualification.16 In-
deed, a finding of "inherent prejudice," while justifiable in the
small office setting of Shinkle, should not be automatic when con-
tact is remote and screening is reasonable and feasible.6 7 It is
submitted that a contrary interpretation, requiring wholesale dis-
qualification, would impede justice by necessitating inefficient
prosecutions by inexperienced outside attorneys. 68 Thus, courts
ual attorney from the Legal Aid office which handled the defendant's case should be dis-
qualified, even though he had no personal dealings with the case. At the same time, a
hearing should be held to determine if the defendant nonetheless would be prejudiced if the
District Attorney's office continued to prosecute the case. Otherwise, one legal aid attorney's
familiarity with a case need not be imputed to another. Compare People v. Wilkins, 28
N.Y.2d 53, 55, 268 N.E.2d 756, 757, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (1971) with Laskey Bros. of W. Va.,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955). To make a double
presumption, that is, a presumption of knowledge of a case at legal aid and then an imputa-
tion of that knowledge to the District Attorney's office would be unjustified and result in
unfounded and unnecessary disqualifications. See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to
Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 682 n.24 (1980). One court has refused
to presume that the knowledge of an assistant district attorney will be divulged to other
members of the same staff. See People v. Schiraldi, 93 Misc. 2d 343, 351, 400 N.Y.S.2d 472,
477 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1977).
An interesting approach to the issue of imputed knowledge in a district attorney's office
has been taken by a California court. Chadwick v. Superior Ct., 106 Cal. App. 3d 108, 164
Cal. Rptr. 864 (Ct. App. 1980). The Chadwick court indicated that DR 5-105(D) of the
Code, which prohibits one member of a firm from accepting employment that another mem-
ber could not, had no application to government lawyers. Id. at 118, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J.
517 (1976). Furthermore, the Chadwick court noted that the prosecutor has an affirmative
obligation "to seek justice, not merely to convict." 106 Cal. App. 3d at 118, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
868. Cf. People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 393, 414 N.E.2d 705, 707, 434 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207
(1980) (prosecutor's mission is to achieve a just result); ABA STANDARDS, THE PRosE UcTrON
FUNCTION § 3-1.1(c) (1979) (duty of prosecutor to seek justice, not to convict). The facts in
Chadwick were distinguishable from those in Shinkle in that the attorney in conflict in
Chadwick strictly handled juvenile matters, had an office in a different building than the
district attorney's office and had been supervised by a deputy who did not handle the con-
flicting case. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 864. Under these circumstances, the
appearance of impropriety may be dispelled.
168 See note 138 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that a case in which a
Legal Aid attorney enters a District Attorney's office of two hundred attorneys should not
be treated on the same plane as a case in which an attorney joins a four-member office.
Rather, courts should determine whether the defendant's trial will be tainted by virtue of
the presence of his former attorney in the prosecutor's office.
167 Id.
I'8 When the court is forced to appoint a special prosecutor, a private attorney, not
necessarily familiar with prosecution procedure, is given the case, see note 141 supra. Pre-
sumably much of the work done by the attorney will be a duplication of work done by the
district attorney's office. Increases in cost and delays in time are often the result. Telephone
conversation with Joseph Jaffe, District Attorney for Sullivan County (March 9, 1981).
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should cautiously apply the disqualification rule in a manner calcu-
lated to fulfill the dual purposes of avoiding impropriety and en-
suring the fair and efficient administration of justice.
Richard J. Bowler
Evidence of post-accident design modification held admissible in
strict products liability manufacturing defect action
Evidence of post-accident repairs or design modifications tra-
ditionally has been held inadmissible in a negligence cause of ac-
tion.""' It had been unclear, however, whether this exclusionary
too See Corcoran v. Village of Peekskill, 108 N.Y. 151, 155, 15 N.E. 309, 309-10 (1888);
Reed v. New York Cent. R.R., 45 N.Y. 574, 580 (1871); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 275, at
666-67 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 168, at 136-37 (10th ed. J. Prince
1973). There are two well-accepted reasons for excluding evidence of post-accident design
modifications in negligence suits. First, such evidence lacks probative force, since subse-
quent design modification, as well as subsequent repairs, represent "after-the-fact" conduct
irrelevant to the issue of foreseeability. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 283, at 151 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961); Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs,
1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 840-41; Note, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1976). The second reason for excluding evi-
dence of post-accident design modifications rests on policy grounds. A tortfeasor may be
deterred from making improvements or otherwise correcting a defective condition if evi-
dence of the change could be introduced as an admission of prior negligence. See, e.g., Bolm
v. Triumph Corp., 71 App. Div. 2d 429, 436, 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 974 (4th Dep't 1979); Cos-
tello & Weinberger, The Subsequent Repair Doctrine and Products Liability, 51 N.Y.S.B.J.
463, 464 (1979). This deterrence rationale has been criticized. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Ex-
clusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of Repair, 7 FORUM 1, 6 (1971).
Nonetheless, some commentators believe that this policy consideration is the more compel-
ling reason for not permitting evidence of subsequent design modifications or repairs. See 2
J. WIGNIORE, supra, § 283, at 151; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, 1
407[02], at 407-09 & n.5 (1981).
Notwithstanding the relevancy and policy rationales which underlie the rule excluding
post-accident design modifications or repairs as proof of negligence, such evidence has been
found admissible for other relevant purposes. W. RICHARDSON, supra § 168, at 137. Evidence
of subsequent repairs is admissible to prove maintenance and control, see, e.g., Slattery v.
Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1951); Xavier v. Grunberg, 67 App. Div. 2d 632, 632,
412 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1st Dep't 1979); Mason v. City of N.Y., 29 App. Div. 2d 922, 923, 288
N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (1st Dep't 1968); Olivia v. Gouze, 285 App. Div. 762, 765, 140 N.Y.S.2d
438, 441 (1st Dep't 1955), affd, 1 N.Y.2d 811, 135 N.E.2d 602, 153 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1956), to
impeach the testimony of a witness, see Devaney v. Degnon-McLean Constr. Co., 79 App.
Div. 62, 64, 79 N.Y.S. 1050, 1052 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 178 N.Y. 620, 70 N.E. 1098 (1904),
or to prove the feasibility of a safety precaution, see Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 71 App. Div.
2d 429, 436, 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 974 (4th Dep't 1979); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra,
407[04], at 407-16; Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, supra, at
842. For a discussion of the rule's apparent weakness as a consequence of these exceptions,
see Slough, Relevancy Unraveled-Part III: Remote and Prejudicial Evidence, 5 KAN. L.
